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Abstract 
The current research investigated differences in reactive and proactive cognitive 
control as a function of depressive symptomatology. Three participant groups with 
varying symptom levels (BDI-II score) completed both the classic and an emotional-
face Stroop task separately under speed and accuracy instructions. All groups made 
equivalent speed-accuracy trade-offs independent of task, suggesting that proactive 
adjustments are unaffected by depressive symptoms. Additionally, groups made 
equivalent reactive control adjustments (Stroop effects, congruency sequence 
effects) in the classic Stroop task, suggesting that these reactive control adjustments 
are spared across a wide range of BDI-II scorers. In contrast, the high BDI-II group 
displayed a selective impairment in the resolution of conflict in the emotional-face 
Stroop task. Thus, while proactive control and many aspects of reactive control were 
unaffected by the level of depressive symptoms, specific impairments occurred when 
current task demands required the trial-to-trial regulation of emotional processing.  
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Reactive and proactive cognitive control under increased depressive symptoms: 
Insights from the classic and emotional-face Stroop task. 
 
The human cognitive system possesses a remarkable ability to exert control over 
information processing, allowing us to make efficient, goal-directed behaviours in 
complex and challenging environments.  This regulation of cognition is a dynamic 
process, initiated either proactively by pre-determined, external goals or reactively 
after unexpected challenges to on-going performance (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter & Cohen, 2001; Braver, Gray & Burgess, 2007; Braver, 2012; Wühr & Kunde, 
2008). Proactive control processes facilitate the sustained maintenance of future-
oriented goal-states by optimizing performance through the prolonged biasing of 
information processing systems. In contrast, reactive control is past-oriented; 
triggering the transient up-regulation of control after spontaneous challenges to 
performance, such as response conflict. Importantly, reactive control adjustments 
require internal performance monitoring processes (putatively located within the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), see Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001; 
Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012), which signal the need for increased control after 
processing challenges (this top-down control is achieved by other brain structures, 
e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone & Nieuwenhuis, 2004).  
In addition to this variation in the expression of cognitive control, executive 
impairments have been reported in various psychopathologies such as 
schizophrenia (Barch & Ceasar, 2012; Kerns et al., 2005), attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (e.g., King, Colla, Brass, Heuser, & Cramon, 2007) and, 
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of importance for the current research, depression (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; West, 
Choi & Travers, 2010). In addition to the profound and sustained low mood which 
often characterises depression, the disorder is associated with subjective feelings of 
impaired concentration and general loss of interest (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV), American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 
suggesting that attentional and goal-motivated cognitive control processes might be 
impaired as a function of increased depressive symptoms. Furthermore, functional 
neuroimaging research consistently implicates the dysfunction of the fronto-cingulate 
structures which underlie cognitive control in the neuropsycholgy of depression and 
low mood (Liotti & Mayberg, 2002; Mayberg, 1997; Pizzagalli, 2011). Consequently, 
several authors have suggested that both proactive and reactive control processes 
might be impaired in participants with elevated depressive symptoms (Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008; West, Choi & Travers, 2010).  
Studies of reactive cognitive control often focus on interference tasks such as 
the Stroop paradigm. Once described as “the gold standard of attentional measures” 
(Macleod, 1992), the classic colour-word Stroop protocol (Stroop, 1935) has been 
used extensively in experimental psychology, contributing to both the formulation of 
current models of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver et al., 2007) 
and investigations of disordered processing in various psychopathologies (e.g., 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Kerns et al., 2005; King et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2002). 
In the classic task responses are reliably slower and more error-prone during 
incompatible trials in which participants must suppress a pre-potent response (e.g., 
word reading when the word “BLUE” is written in red ink) as opposed to compatible 
trials in which both task relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions are associated 
with the same response alternative (e.g., colour naming when the word “BLUE” is 
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written in blue ink). Furthermore, Stroop interference effects are modulated 
dynamically as a function of conflict experienced in the previous trial: The Stroop 
effect is typically reduced following high compared to low conflict trials. This 
congruency sequence effect (CSE) is commonly explained by a conflict adaptation 
mechanism where the experience of conflict recruits increased attentional control, 
reducing the influence of irrelevant stimulus dimensions on post-conflict trials 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 2007; Kerns et al., 2004; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & 
Botvinick, 2005). Thus, in addition to classic Stroop interference, CSEs provide 
further evidence that cognitive control is reactively up-regulated after processing 
interference (see Botvinick et al., 2001; di Pellegrino, Ciaramelli & Làdvas, 2007; 
Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Wühr & Kunde, 2008). 
Importantly, the CSE has been shown to diminish severely as both inter-stimulus- 
and response-stimulus-intervals increase (Egner, Ely & Grinband, 2010; see also 
West et al., 2010; Wühr & Ansorage, 2005), suggesting that CSEs reflect 
interference resolution processes oriented to the recent experience of conflict, and 
not to control processes which develop over time in expectation of upcoming conflict 
(cf. Egner et al., 2010; for similar a suggestion see Alpay, Goerke & Stürmer, 2009). 
It should be noted, however,  that within one computational framework (Dipisapia & 
Braver, 2006),  the CSE might be considered a reactively triggered, short-term 
increase in proactive control (see Dipisapia & Braver, 2006; Braver et al., 2007; but 
see Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Scherbaum, Dshemuchadse, Fischer & Goschke, 
2010).  
In relation to depression, studies of Stroop interference have often used 
blocked designs in which Stroop interference is operationalized as the difference 
between the time to read a list of incompatible stimuli minus the reading time for 
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compatible or neutral word lists. While these studies often found increased Stroop 
interference in depressed groups (e.g., Moritz et al., 2002; Trichard et al., 1995; but 
see Egeland et al., 2003), it is important to note that proactive control can dominate 
performance in circumstances where upcoming conflict is entirely predictable (De 
Pisapia & Braver, 2006). Conversely, studies employing the randomised presentation 
of compatibility levels within blocks have often failed to find depression realted 
differences in Stroop interference (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Meiran, 
Diamond, Toder & Nemets, 2011; Wagner et al., 2006, but see Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2008). Addittionally, randomised designs permit the investigation of the CSE. While 
some studies have reported impaired CSEs in depressed groups using the classic 
Stroop task (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007, Meiran et al., 2011), many others have not 
found such depression-related impairments in a variety of conflict paradigms 
(Stroop-type: Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; West et al., 2010, Simon task: Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2007; Ng, Chan & Schlaghecken, 2012; Flanker task: Pizzagalli, 
Peccoralo, Davidson, & Cohen, 2006). Finally, it is important to note that many of 
these studies also biased the ratio of compatible to incompatible stimuli, altering both 
task difficulty and conflict-expectancy (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008; Meiran et al., , 2011; West et al., 2010). Thus, the current study 
investigated the operation of reactive control processes (Stroop interference, CSEs) 
as a function of increasing depressive symptomatology when trial compatibility levels 
are equiprobable and presented in a randomised order. For these purposes we used 
the classic colour-word Stroop task due to its prevalence in the existing literature, 
allowing comparison with existing results.  
While the classic Stroop task provides a reliable laboratory paradigm to 
investigate individual differences in attentional control, the task cannot inform us on 
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the ability to detect and resolve conflict which arises from affective environmental 
distractors. Depression has consistently been associated with impairments in tasks 
which require the regulation, inhibition or manipulation of affective content (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Joormann, 2004; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Frank & Crombez, 
2005), thus, it might be predicted that elevated depression would be associated with 
an impaired ability to resolve interference from affective distractors. The emotional-
face Stroop task (Etkin, Egner, Kandel & Hirsch, 2006) is a laboratory protocol 
specifically designed to investigate such affective conflict. In this paradigm 
participants must selectively respond to a relevant emotional stimulus dimension 
(affective face) whilst avoiding the processing of irrelevant, sometimes conflicting, 
emotional distractors (affective word). Thus, akin to the classic Stroop task, conflict 
occurs when relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions are in semantic opposition 
(e.g., negative facial expression; word: “HAPPY”). Additionally, CSEs similar to those 
observed in the classic Stroop task occur in the emotional-face Stroop task, 
reflecting the ability to resolve emotional conflict on a trial-to-trial basis. Important for 
current concerns, past research suggests that a distinct mechanism facilitates 
executive, top-down control over this emotional conflict by resolving processing 
interference caused by simultaneously activated affective representations (Egner et 
al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2006; Etkin et al., 2011; Maier and di Pellegrino, 2012; Monti, 
Weintraub and Egner, 2010; Soutschek & Schubert, 2013). Given that depression 
has previously been related to particular impairments in control adjustments when 
tasks or events require the regulation, inhibition and manipulation of affective 
information processing (e.g., Elliott, Sahakian, Herrod, Robbins & Paykel, 1997; 
Elliott, Sahakian, McKay, Herrod, Robbins, & Paykel, 1996; Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Joormann et al., 2011), we hypothesised that 
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increased depressive symptoms would be associated with particular impairment in 
the trial-to-trial resolution of interference arising from affective distractors.   
Unlike reactive control, much less is known about the relationship between 
sustained, proactive control processes and depression. In a recent ERP study, West 
et al. (2010) explored proactive control processes as a function of increasing 
negative affect. The authors observed that during a counting Stroop task, their 
electrophysiological measure of proactive control (the pre-stimulus slow wave) was 
reduced. From these results, West et al. (2010) concluded that proactive processes 
were impaired as a function of increasing depressive symptoms. It is important to 
note, however, that no behavioural difference was related to the level of depressive 
symptoms in their study. In order to provide a behavioural measure of preparatory, 
sustained control processes, we instructed participants to prioritise either speed or 
accuracy during task performance. Importantly, many authors consider the ability to 
adjust response-thresholds in order to trade-off speed for accuracy and vice versa to 
be a fundamental component of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Jentzsch & Leuthold, 2006; Jones, Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & Braver, 2002; Laming, 
1979; Saunders & Jentzsch, 2012; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). In contrast to the 
transient modification of control settings observed in reactive control, successful 
compliance with externally provided Speed-Accuracy Trade-off (SAT) instructions 
requires the proactive modulation of response strategy over a number of trials. 
Furthermore, although several models of SAT exist, almost all theories suggest that 
such trade-offs are created by adapting the response threshold of decision-related 
mechanisms to create either more or less conservative responding (see Bogacz, 
Wagenmakers, Forstmann & Nieuwenhuis, 2009; van Veen, Krug & Carter, 2008; 
Wenzlaff, Bauer, Maess, & Heekeren, 2011). Therefore, in line with previous 
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suggestions (West et al., 2010), we hypothesised that increased depressive 
symptoms would be related to the impaired implementation of these explicit, 
proactive adjustments.  
 
Method 
Participants 
72 individuals (mean age = 21.4, S.D. = 3.1, 53 females), recruited from the 
University of St Andrews subject pool (~50% answering advertisement seeking “low 
mood” participants), participated for course credits or cash reimbursement (£5/hour). 
Nine participants were excluded due to either non-compliance with experimental 
procedure (3 participants); withdrawal before study completion (1 participant) or 
currently taking psychoactive medication (5 participants). 
 Three groups were formed depending on Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) score. The low BDI-II group included all participants 
scoring below 7 (25 participants; mean BDI-II = 2.7, range = 0-6). Participants 
scoring ≥ 17 were included in the high BDI-II group (19 participants; mean BDI-II = 
25.7, range = 18-38) as this score yields a high true-positive rate (see Beck et al., 
1996). Importantly, this method ensured that our highest symptom group had similar 
mean BDI-II scores as Major Depressive Disorder groups selected by clinical 
interview in similar experiments (e.g, Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008).  While previous 
research has often discarded medium scorers (e.g., Compton et al., 2008; Watson, 
Dritschel, Jentzsch, & Obonsawin, 2008) we collected a sufficient number to permit 
their inclusion in the analyses (19 participants, mean BDI-II = 10.6, range = 7-16). 
Groups did not differ on mean age, F(2, 60) = 1.60, p > .10, or gender, χ2(2, N = 63) 
= 4.08, p >.10. Additionally, the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait (STAI-T; 
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Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) served as a measure of trait 
anxiety. For our participants BDI-II scores were highly correlated with STAI-T scores, 
r = .878, p <.01. All participants gave informed consent, spoke English fluently and 
were tested in a single session. 
Apparatus and Stimuli  
The stimuli were presented centrally on a 17-in. CRT monitor controlled by an 
IBM-compatible personal computer. Two response keypads were used with one 
keypad assigned to each participant. Each keypad had two response keys, mounted 
15 cm apart in the horizontal plane of the participant. The classic Stroop task 
consisted of the words ‘BLUE’ and ‘RED’ presented in either blue or red font. The 
emotional-face Stroop comprised 16 face stimuli (4 male, 4 female, showing either 
happy or sad expressions; Ekman & Friessen, 1976). Images were masked to 
remove hair, body and background details. Either the word “HAPPY” or “SAD” was 
printed beneath each face. All words were presented in capital letters, each letter 
measuring approximately 10 x 7 mm. The masked faces measured approximately 50 
x 30 mm. 
Procedure 
Task (classic or emotional) and SAT instruction (fast or accurate) was 
manipulated within-subjects and between blocks (4 block conditions). Each block 
condition contained 384 trials (with rests after every 96 trials). Half of the participants 
first completed the classic Stroop task, the remainder began with the emotional-face 
Stroop. SAT instructions were balanced across participants within each task. In the 
classic Stroop task participants were instructed: “Please respond to the PRINTED 
colour of the words as ACCURATELY as possible”.  For blocks in which speed was 
instructed the word “ACCURATELY” was replaced with “QUICKLY”. In the emotional-
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face Stroop task the instructions were: “Please respond to the EMOTION expressed 
by the face as… QUICKLY [or] ACCURATELY…as possible”. After being instructed 
participants completed 10 practice trials per condition and then completed the main 
experimental blocks.  
Participants were seated in a darkened testing booth approximately 80cm from 
the computer screen.   Responses were made with left and right key presses using 
the left and right index fingers, respectively. Responses were made to the font colour 
of the word (classic Stroop task) and to the emotional expression of the face 
(emotional-face Stroop task). Assignment of targets to response alternatives was 
balanced across participants. Stimuli were presented until response (max. 1500 ms), 
after which a fixation point appeared for 1650 ms between trials. Lastly, the BDI-II 
and STAI-T were administered. 
Data Analysis 
Only RTs between 100 and 1500 ms in trials N-1, and N were considered 
correct. Trials with missing, too slow or too fast responses (< 1%) in trials N-1 and/or 
trial N were discarded. Error responses in trial N or N-1 were discarded from RT 
analyses. 
An initial omnibus ANOVA revealed an interaction between Task, Group, 
Previous Compatibility and Current Compatibility, F(2, 60) = 4.00, p = .023, ηp2 = .12, 
suggesting that performance in the two paradigms was not equal across groups. 
Thus, subsequent analyses were conducted for each task separately. Importantly, in 
order to report the critical speed-accuracy manipulation we retained the SAT factor in 
the task-wise analyses. Consequently, RTs and choice-error rates were subjected to 
separate repeated measures ANOVAs for the emotional and classic Stroop tasks1. 
The within-subjects variables were SAT instructions (speed vs. accuracy); Previous 
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Compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible); and Current Compatibility. The between-
subjects factor was Group (Low, Medium, High BDI-II score). Bonferroni corrected p-
values are presented for post-hoc tests. 
 
Results 
Classic Stroop task 
RTs: Responses were faster under speed (366 ms) than accuracy instructions (427 
ms); F(1, 60) = 61.09, p < .001, ηp
2 = .50.  Importantly, this difference was not 
modulated by group, F(2, 60) < .70, p > .50 (see Figure 1). 
RTs were higher for incompatible (405 ms) than compatible trials (388 ms) F(1, 
60) = 56.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .48 and this compatibility effect was larger under 
accuracy than speed instructions, F(1, 60) = 16.16, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21. RTs also 
showed a main effect of previous compatibility, F(1, 60) = 5.57, p = .022, ηp
2 = .09, 
due to slightly faster RTs after compatible than incompatible trials. The effect of 
current compatibility did not interact with group, F(2, 60) < .03, p > .97, indicating that 
Stroop effects (incompatible minus compatible) did not differ as a function of group in 
the classic Stroop task. 
Importantly, previous and current trial compatibility interacted, F(1, 60) = 28.77, 
ps < .001, ηp
2 = .34. That is, the Stroop effect was smaller following incompatible (11 
ms) than compatible trials (25 ms). This congruency sequence effect (CSE) was 
further modulated by SAT, F(1, 60) = 10.96, p = .002, ηp
2 = .15; the CSE was present 
only under accuracy, F(1, 60) = 30.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, but not speed instructions, 
F(1, 60) = 3.69, p = .12, ηp
2 = .06. Importantly, the CSE did not interact with group, 
F(2, 60) = .16, p > .853 (this was also the case when CSE analyses only included the 
accuracy condition: Group x CSE,  F < 1, ns.). Therefore, groups did not differ in their 
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ability to make these reactive cognitive control adjustments, see Figure 2 (gray bars), 
and Table 1. No other effects were significant. 
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
s
 [
m
s
]
350
400
450
500
SPEED
ACCURACY
Low BDI Medium BDI High BDI
E
rr
o
r 
R
a
te
s
 [
%
]
0
2
4
6
8
10
 
Figure 1: Mean RT (top) and error rates (bottom) as a function of SAT instruction (Speed vs. 
Accuracy) and Group. Error bars depict S.E.M. As no group differences emerged in the SAT effect for 
either task, means were collapsed across tasks for purposes of these figures only. 
Choice error rates: Responses were more error prone under speed (6.2%) than 
accuracy instructions (2.6%); F(1, 60) = 40.65, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40. Together with the 
RT findings, this result confirms that our manipulation of SAT was successful in the 
classic Stroop task. Importantly, this SAT effect was not modulated by group, F(2, 
60) = .77, p > .47, suggesting the high BDI-II group had no detectable impairment in 
implementing these proactive adjustments (see Figure 1). 
Error rates were higher for incompatible (5.1%) than compatible trials (3.7%), 
F(1, 60) = 15.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21. This Stroop effect did not interact with group, 
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F(2, 60) = .71, p > .49. Importantly, previous and current trial compatibility interacted, 
F(1, 60) = 5.94, p = .018, ηp
2 = .09; the Stroop effect was smaller following 
incompatible (0.9%) than compatible trials (2.0%). As with RTs, this CSE did not 
interact with group, all F(2, 60) = 1.23, p > .49 (see Table 1). No other effects 
reached significance. 
 
Table 1 : Summary of mean RTs [ms] and choice error rates [%] in the Classic Stroop 
task 
 
  
BDI-II GROUP 
LOW 
 
MEDIUM 
 
HIGH 
          Instruction Seq. RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%] 
          Speed cC 349 6.5 
 
348 4.9 
 
381 6.3 
 
cI 358 8.7 
 
365 5.9 
 
396 8.1 
 
iC 349 7.6 
 
353 5.0 
 
381 6.5 
 
iI 358 6.3 
 
365 4.4 
 
384 8.6 
          Accuracy cC 405 2.3 
 
392 1.5 
 
439 1.5 
 
cI 443 4.4 
 
425 3.3 
 
474 3.8 
 
iC 408 2.7 
 
398 1.8 
 
448 2.4 
 
iI 421 3.8 
 
410 2.6 
 
464 3.1 
                   
     Note. 'Seq.' denotes trial compatibility sequence, lower case i/c and upper-case I/C indicate the 
compatibility level on trial N-1 and N, respectively  
            
Emotional-face Stroop task 
RTs: Responses were faster under speed (469 ms) than accuracy instructions (556 
ms), F(1, 60) = 71.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = .55, however, this effect did not interact with 
group, (F < 1, p > .10; see Figure 1). RTs were higher for incompatible (523 ms) than 
compatible (502 ms) trials, indicating the presence of a Stroop effect (incompatible 
minus compatible), F(1, 60) = 60.10 , p < .001, ηp
2 = .50, which was slightly larger 
under accuracy (24 ms) than speed instructions (17 ms), F(1, 60) = 5.64, p = .021, 
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ηp
2 = .09. This compatibility effect did not interact with group, F(2, 60) = 1.63, p > .20. 
Previous and current trial compatibility tended to interact, F(1, 60) > 2.87, p = .095, 
ηp
2 = .05, indicating the presence of CSE effect. This CSE further interacted with 
SAT, F(1, 60) = 5.13, p = .027, ηp
2 = 0.08; due to control adjustments occurring only 
under accuracy, F(1, 60) = 6.68, p = .024, ηp
2 = .10, but not speed instructions, F < 1, 
p > .10. 
Importantly for the current hypotheses, BDI-II group interacted with the CSE, 
F(2, 60) = 6.26, p = .003, ηp
2 = 0.174, indicating that emotional conflict resolution 
differed between groups. Although the inclusion of SAT was not strictly justified by a 
5 way interaction in the original omnibus ANOVA, it is clear from inspection of the 
means (see Table 2) that the group difference was restricted to the accuracy 
instructions. This observation was qualified by a significant 4-way interaction 
between SAT, Group and the CSE, F(2, 60) = 4.12, p = .021, ηp
2 = 0.125. Further 
post-hoc tests confirmed that the interaction between CSEs and group was only 
present under accuracy, F(2, 60) = 8.32, p = .002, ηp
2 = .22, but not speed 
instructions, F(2, 60) = 0.82, p = .45, ηp
2 = .026. Specifically, CSEs ([Stroop effect 
after previous compatible trials] minus [Stroop effect after previous incompatible 
trials]) in the accuracy condition were reduced in the high (-13 ms) compared to both 
the low (15 ms), t(42)  = 2.62, p = .036, d = 0.80, and medium BDI-II group (31 ms), 
t(36) = 4.24, p < .001, d = 1.44,  no difference between the low and medium BDI-II 
group was found (p > .10), see Figure 2 and Table 2. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant.    
Choice error rates: Responses were more error prone under speed (10.7%) than 
accuracy instructions (4.7%), F(1, 60) = 60.09, p = .001, ηp
2 = .50, indicating that our 
SAT manipulation was also successful in the emotional-face Stroop task. Importantly, 
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this SAT effect was not modulated by group, (F(2, 60) =.47, p > .62; see Figure 1). 
Error rates were higher for incompatible trials (9.6%) than compatible trials (5.9%), 
indicating the presence of a Stroop effect, F(1, 60) = 72.78, p < .001, ηp
2 = .55, which 
was larger under speed than accuracy instructions, F(1, 60) = 21.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.26. Error rates also showed a main effect of previous compatibility, F(1, 65) = 5.25, 
p = .026, ηp
2 = .08 due to very slightly higher error rates after compatible (8.0%) than 
incompatible (7.4%) trials. Neither the Stroop nor the effect of previous compatibility 
interacted with group, both Fs(2, 60) < .43, ps > .64.  Previous and current trial 
compatibility interacted in error rates, F(1, 60) > 27.94, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31, indicating 
the presence of a CSE, however, this did not interact with group, see Table 2. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant.    
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Figure 2: Mean RT CSEs in the accuracy condition of both the classic (gray bars) and the emotional-
face Stroop (white bars) task. CSEs were calculated as (Stroop effect after previous compatible trials) 
minus (Stroop effect after previous incompatible trials), therefore, positive values indicate a reduction 
in the Stroop effect after conflict.  Error bars depict the standard error of the mean. 
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Table 2: Summary of mean RTs [ms] and choice error rates [%] in the Emotional-face Stroop task 
 
  
BDI-II GROUP 
LOW 
 
MEDIUM 
 
HIGH 
          Instruction Seq. RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%] 
          Speed cC 448 7.9 
 
450 6.8 
 
488 9.3 
 
cI 460 13.1 
 
475 13.7 
 
498 16.3 
 
iC 444 9.1 
 
452 7.0 
 
482 10.2 
 
iI 463 11.1 
 
473 11.0 
 
495 13.3 
          Accuracy cC 513 3.5 
 
532 3.5 
 
572 3.7 
 
cI 540 7.1 
 
579 6.2 
 
589 8.0 
 
iC 526 4.3 
 
551 3.6 
 
567 4.2 
 
iI 537 5.3 
 
567 4.7 
 
597 5.5 
                   
 
Note. 'Seq.' denotes trial compatibility sequence, lower-case i/c and upper-case I/C indicate the 
compatibility level on trial N-1 and N, respectively. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The current study assessed the operation of reactive and proactive cognitive control 
processes as well as the resolution of emotional conflict as a function of increasing 
depressive symptoms. The first novel finding of the current experiment was that SAT 
adjustments did not differ across groups, suggesting the spared implementation of 
these proactive adjustments across the range of participants included in our study. 
Secondly, as most aspects of reactive control (Stroop interference in both tasks and 
CSEs in the classic Stroop paradigm) were unimpaired in all groups, the current 
results do not support the idea of a general impairment in reactive control in those 
reporting elevated depressive symptoms. In contrast to these findings, participants in 
the highest BDI-II group showed selectively impaired CSEs in the affective task. 
More specifically, while high BDI-II scorers did not differ from low and medium range 
participants on overall Stroop effects in the emotional-face task, they demonstrated a 
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highly selective impairment in the ability to resolve conflict arising in this affective 
paradigm. 
Given prior suggestions that negative moods might impair proactive control 
processes (Braver et al., 2007; West et al., 2010), we predicted that SAT 
adjustments would be impaired in the high symptom group, however, this was not 
the case. These results appear to challenge recent interpretations of ERP findings 
(West et al., 2010) where increasing depressive symptoms were associated with the 
reduced amplitude of an ERP (pre-stimulus slow wave) relating to proactive control. 
Importantly, unlike the former study, we gave participants explicit, external 
performance goals to maintain over time (e.g., “respond as accurately as possible”), 
allowing preparatory control processes to be quantified behaviourally. Conversely, 
West et al. (2010) interpreted the reduction of a pre-stimulus slow wave as reflecting 
impaired proactive control, however, they found no behavioural differences as a 
function of increasing depressive symptoms. Importantly, pre-stimulus slow waves 
may be related to both motoric (preparatory activation preceding an imperative 
stimulus, Leuthold, Sommer & Ulrich, 2004), and non-motoric processes (general 
anticipatory processes preceding a stimulus, van Boxtel & Bocker, 2004), therefore, 
a finding of reduced pre-stimulus slow wave alone does not necessarily permit the 
conclusion that preparatory control processes are compromised in a particular group 
of individuals. 
Secondly, we found little evidence for generally impaired reactive control as a 
function of increasing depressive symptoms. These results are consistent with 
previous reports of unimpaired Stroop interference in a range of clinical and 
subclinical cohorts using non-emotional Stroop paradigms (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2007; Meiran et al., 2011; West et al., 2010). Similarly, CSEs were unimpaired as a 
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function of increasing BDI-II score in the classic Stroop task, which is consistent with 
similar findings reported in other studies (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Ng et al., 
2012; West et al., 2010). Importantly, when our analyses controlled for potential 
mnemonic contributors to the CSE (Hommel, Proctor & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh & 
Laurey, 2003) or restricted analyses to post-conflict performance benefits on 
incompatible trials alone (i.e., RT cI minus iI; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007), significant 
and BDI-II group independent CSEs remained, suggesting that control processes 
made a significant contribution to these effects (see also, Egner, 2007; Ullsperger et 
al., 2005). Finally, it has recently been suggested that instead of speeding on iI 
relative to cI trials, CSEs are mainly driven by faster responses on cC compared to 
iC trials, suggesting that CSEs may be driven mainly by speeding on sequences of 
conflict-free trials and not adaptations after conflict rich-trials (Schlaghecken & 
Martini, 2012). However, in the current study we found no evidence for asymmetrical 
effects of previous conflict on subsequent compatible or incompatible trials6. Thus, 
despite finding robust Stroop interference effects and CSEs, we were unable to find 
significant depressive-symptom related impairments in reactive control in the classic 
Stroop task. 
Importantly, as previous studies have uncovered impaired CSEs in those with 
increased depressive symptoms (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008; Meiran et al., 2011), it is necessary to consider why discrepant 
results might occur between investigations. First, regarding our sample, we studied a 
larger cohort of high symptom scorers than previous investigations which uncovered 
CSE impairment (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007: N = 13; Meiran et al., 2011: N = 9). 
Furthermore, our High BDI-II sample also reported numerically higher depressive 
symptoms than sample of Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007).  Therefore, simple 
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variations in sample size and symptom severity between cohorts provide unlikely 
explanations for the divergence of results across investigations. Similarly, previous 
studies biased the proportion of conflict trials either towards compatible (Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2007) or incompatible stimuli (Meiran et al., 2011). While we avoided such 
frequency manipulations as they bias performance towards reactive and proactive 
control, respectively (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012; De Pisapia & Braver, 2006), 
studies with such frequency manipulations have also often failed to find general 
depression-related CSE impairment in the classic Stroop task (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2008), the Simon task (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007) and a counting Stroop task (West 
et al., 2010). Thus, given the results from both our study and that of prior 
investigations, depressive symptomatology does not appear to be associated with 
particularly robust or easily replicable impairments in reactive cognitive control. 
Most important, however, for present purpose, we found the CSEs to be 
reduced in the highest depressive symptom group in the emotional-face Stroop task 
compared to participants with low levels of depressive symptoms. Interestingly, 
affect-specific mechanisms are proposed to underlie the top-down regulation of 
interference caused by emotional distractors (Etkin et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008; 
Maier et al., 2012; Soutscheck & Schubert, 2013). Therefore, a specific impairment 
in these affective-regulatory processes might explain the observed differences 
between groups in our study. In line with this hypothesis, Holmes and Pizzagalli 
(2007) reported CSE impairments especially for elevated BDI-II scorers when blocks 
were preceded by negative emotional feedback. Therefore, converging evidence 
appears to suggest that impaired reactive control adjustments may occur as a 
function of increasing depressive symptomatology selectively in tasks which require 
the concurrent processing of affective information. On a neuroanatomical level, 
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evidence (Etkin et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008; Maier et al., 2012) suggests that the 
functioning of the rostral ACC is central to the resolution of emotional conflict in the 
emotional-face Stroop task (see also Etkin et al., 2011). Interestingly, studies have 
observed the dysfunction of the rostral ACC in depressed groups in tasks which 
require the inhibition of affective information processing (e.g., Eugène, Joormann, 
Cooney, Atlas, & Gotlib, 2010; Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008). In light of these prior 
findings, it seems plausible that the impairment observed in our high BDI-II group 
may stem from the dysfunction of this neural structure.  Future functional 
neuroimaging research should aim to clarify this relationship. It is also important to 
note that despite frequently being associated with the dysfunction of the neural 
correlates of cognitive control (George et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Pizzagalli, 2011; West et al., 2010), studies often do not find behavioural differences 
between groups on classic conflict tasks. Therefore, it seems imperative that future 
research aims to account for which neural abnormalities correlated with depressive 
symptoms are predictive of measurable impairments. 
Some differences between the classic and emotional-face Stroop are worthy of 
discussion when evaluating the effects of depressive symptomatology on CSEs in 
each task. As stimulus repetitions occurred more frequently in the classic compared 
to the emotional-face Stroop, the spared ability to make control adjustments across 
BDI-II range in the classic Stroop may in part be attributable to the higher number of 
exact stimulus repetitions in this paradigm. Importantly, group differences did not 
emerge on the classic Stroop even when such repetitions were excluded. Therefore, 
stimulus-specific priming effects cannot explain spared CSE in the high BDI-II group.  
Additionally, RTs and error-rates were generally higher in the emotional than classic 
Stroop task, indicating that the emotional-face Stroop was more difficult. Thus, group 
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differences perhaps emerge on the more difficult task, irrespective of emotion. As an 
alternative to the classic Stroop, a “matched” non-emotional face-Stroop task (i.e., 
naming the sex of a face with either compatible/incompatible irrelevant words) may 
be recommended to resolve this problem. However, existing research comparing 
such non-emotional and emotional face-Stroop performance has consistently found 
increased RT and error rates in the emotional compared to the non-emotional task 
(see Egner et al., 2008; Maier et al., 2012; Monti et al., 2010; Soutschek & Schubert, 
2013, see also similar differences occur in the non-emotional vs. emotional flanker 
task, Samanez-Larkin, Robertson, Mikels, Carstensen, & Gotlib, 2009). Thus, 
regardless of their apparent similarities, emotional interference tasks may be 
generally more difficult than their non-emotional counterparts. Importantly, while 
demonstrating impaired CSEs in the emotional-face Stroop task, overall RTs, error 
rates, and Stroop effects did not differ between the High BDI-II and other participant 
groups, suggesting that the impairment we observed was highly specific to 
interference resolution and not to a general impairment in task performance. 
As a final point, some characteristics of our sample must be noted when 
relating the current results to existing literature. Firstly, BDI-II scores were highly 
correlated with trait anxiety (STAI-T), meaning that it is currently not possible to make 
very strong distinctions between a depression-specific result and one driven by 
general negative affect (common to both depression and anxiety). Such correlations 
between depressive and anxious symptoms are common, and clinical depression 
uncomplicated by such comorbidity is particularly rare (see Hirschfeld, 2001). Thus, 
our high BDI-II group is not unrepresentative of typical cohorts with increased 
depressive symptoms.  Additionally, as we used a sub-clinical sample some 
differences not apparent in our experiment may only emerge in more severely 
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depressed or clinical samples. However, although sub-clinical, our high BDI-II group 
reported moderate to severe depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1996). Thus, given 
that BDI-II scores correlate highly with other measures used to generate clinical 
diagnoses of depression in a number of samples (Beck et al., 1996; Sprinkle et al., 
2002), our data suggests that impairments in reactive control might only occur in 
those reporting very severe symptoms. Secondly, it has been demonstrated that 
antidepressant medication can have a profound effect on emotional information 
processing (see Merens, Van der Does & Spinhoven, 2007). As none of the 
participants in the current experiments were taking anti-depressant medication at the 
time of testing, emotional processing was studied un-confounded by concurrent 
medication status. This factor may explain differences between our study and that of 
De Lissneyder et al., (2012) who found general cognitive control impairments in the 
Internal Shift Task in a clinical sample with no emotion-specific impairment, however, 
their study included a highly medicated depressed group (85%), perhaps explaining 
the lack of emotion-specific effects. 
In conclusion, the current results provide important insights into the operation of 
executive processes as a function of increasing depressive symptoms. Firstly, to our 
knowledge the current study is the first to report that the maintenance of proactive 
speed-accuracy trade-offs are unimpaired across a range of depressive symptoms. 
Secondly, as most aspects of reactive control (e.g., Stroop interference and CSEs in 
the classic task) were unimpaired in all groups, the current findings do not support 
the idea of generally impaired reactive control in depression. Importantly, high BDI-II 
scorers demonstrated a selective impairment in the ability to resolve emotional 
conflict. Together with a prior report of reduced post-conflict adjustments in 
depression when the task included negative emotional feedback (Holmes & 
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Pizzagalli, 2007), converging evidence appears to suggest that reactive, trial-to-trial 
control impairments occur in depression particularly when task demands require 
concurrent emotional information processing. Future work should investigate the 
nature of such emotion-cognition interactions in relation to vulnerability to the onset 
and subsequent duration of depressive episodes. 
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Footnotes 
1. As depression has been associated with mood-congruent attentional biases, it 
may be suggested that elevated BDI-II groups would have higher interference 
effects than the lower BDI-II participants when the conflicting, irrelevant word in 
the emotional-face Stroop task is negative (e.g., positive face, negative word 
compared with positive face, positive word), but not when positive (negative face, 
positive word compared with negative face, negative word). However, we found no 
differences between groups on interference effects when distractor words were 
negative (ps > .10) or positive (ps > .10). Similarly, when previous target emotion 
and current target emotion were entered as factors in the analyses we found no 
emotion-specific influence on the CSEs (all ps > .10).  
2. CSEs remained when repetitions were excluded, F = 6.74, p = .012, no 
interactions with group emerged during this analysis (ps > .10). 
3. This effect remained when repetitions were excluded from the analyses, F = 4.69, 
p = .013. 
4. This four-way interaction persisted when the medium BDI-II group was removed 
from the analyses, F(1, 42) = 6.39, p = .015, and when the participants were split 
into minimal (BDI-II <13) and elevated scorers (BDI-II ≥ 13), F(1, 61) = 4.17, p = 
.046,  as in Holmes & Pizzagalli (2007).  
5. We re-analysed our data using the method of Schlaghecken and Martini (2012), 
focusing on the critical response alternation conditions. Importantly, we did not 
find any significant interactions between compatibility sequence and current 
compatibility for either task (all ps > .10). Therefore, significant support for context 
adaptation did not exist within our current data. 
